Do the Top Domains Actually Protect Their Email?

By Lucian — builder & engineer, LK Forge

SPF, DMARC and MTA-STS are the DNS records that stop someone spoofing mail from your domain. Everyone says to set them — so we queried live DNS for 152 of the most-used domains to see who actually has. The short version: the basics are essentially solved at the top of the web, most domains enforce and don't just monitor — and one newer standard is still almost entirely missing.

The email-security funnel

Of the 152 domains, 146 actually receive mail (they publish an MX record). Among those, the authentication basics are effectively universal — but each further step of protection sheds some adopters, and the last one falls off a cliff.

Key finding: among the 146 mail-receiving domains, SPF is on 100% and DMARC on 99.3% — and it's not decorative: 92.1% of all 152 domains actively enforce DMARC (quarantine or reject). But MTA-STS is on just 9.2%.

0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Receives mail (MX) 96.1% SPF 98.7% DMARC published 98.7% DMARC enforced (quarantine/reject) 92.1% MTA-STS 9.2% lkforge.com
Email-security adoption across 152 top domains (live DNS snapshot). The first four bars are near-full; MTA-STS is the outlier.

Publishing DMARC isn't the story — enforcing it is

A DMARC record can be all bark and no bite. The p= policy decides what a receiver does with mail that fails: p=none is monitor-only (deliver it anyway), p=quarantine sends it to spam, and p=reject drops it. A domain on p=none has DMARC in the technical sense but gains almost no protection. So the meaningful question isn't "do they publish DMARC" but "do they enforce it."

At the top, they do. Of the 152 domains, 114 are on p=reject — the strictest setting — 26 on p=quarantine, and only 10 sit at monitor-only p=none. That's 75% on the strictest policy, and 93.3% of everyone who publishes DMARC is actually enforcing it. "Publish but don't enforce" — the common half-measure — is rare among the biggest domains.

The open frontier: MTA-STS at 9.2%

SPF and DMARC authenticate who sent a message. They do nothing about how it travels. MTA-STS closes that gap: it publishes a policy saying "always deliver to me over TLS, and don't fall back to plaintext," defeating a downgrade attacker sitting between mail servers. It's the natural next step after DMARC — and among these top domains only 9.2% have it.

The reason is friction: MTA-STS needs a hosted policy file on a mta-sts. subdomain plus a DNS record, where SPF and DMARC are each a single TXT line. That extra setup is the whole gap. If you've already done DMARC and want the next real win, this is it — and you'd be joining the 9.2%, not following the crowd.

About the sample

These are 152 of the most-used global domains across tech, retail, media, finance, government and education — which means they skew sophisticated. Read the numbers as "what the best-run domains do," not the general web, where SPF and especially DMARC adoption is far lower. The value here is the shape: at the very top, authentication is solved and enforced, while transport security (MTA-STS) is still the exception.

Reproduce this

Everything comes from scripts/crawl-email-security.mjs — plain DNS lookups against a fixed, documented domain list, no auth and no proprietary data. DNS changes over time, so a re-run may move a point or two; that's expected. The core of each check is one call:

import { promises as dns } from 'node:dns'

const spf   = (await dns.resolveTxt(domain)).flat()
              .some(t => t.toLowerCase().startsWith('v=spf1'))
const dmarc = (await dns.resolveTxt('_dmarc.'  + domain)).flat()
              .find(t => t.toLowerCase().includes('v=dmarc1'))   // read p= for policy
const sts   = (await dns.resolveTxt('_mta-sts.' + domain)).flat()
              .some(t => t.toLowerCase().includes('v=stsv1'))

Run it against your own list and you'll get the same shape of result.

Check your own domain

See what a mail server sees: the SMTP test checks whether a mail host answers and speaks the protocol, and the DNS lookup pulls the raw MX and TXT records — SPF and DMARC included — for any domain. Both run from the browser.

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Common Questions

What email-authentication records should a domain publish?

Three matter most. SPF (an "v=spf1" TXT record) lists which servers may send mail as the domain. DMARC (a "v=DMARC1" TXT record at _dmarc.<domain>) tells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF or DKIM, and where to send reports. MTA-STS (a policy at _mta-sts.<domain>) forces inbound mail to arrive over TLS, closing a downgrade attack. Of 152 top domains we checked, 98.7% publish SPF and 98.7% publish DMARC, but only 9.2% publish MTA-STS.

What percentage of top domains use DMARC?

Almost all of them. Across 152 of the most-used domains, 98.7% publish a DMARC record — and among the 146 that actually receive mail (have an MX record), it's 99.3%. More importantly, most enforce it: 114 are on the strictest p=reject policy and 26 on p=quarantine, so 92.1% of all these domains actively enforce DMARC rather than just monitoring. Caveat: this is a top-domains sample and skews far ahead of the general web.

What is the difference between DMARC p=none, p=quarantine and p=reject?

The p= tag is the policy. p=none is monitor-only — the domain collects failure reports but tells receivers to deliver failing mail anyway, so it offers no real protection. p=quarantine asks receivers to treat failing mail as suspicious (usually spam-foldered). p=reject asks them to drop it outright, which is the strongest anti-spoofing stance. Among the top domains, 114 of 152 are on p=reject and only 10 are stuck at monitor-only p=none.

What is MTA-STS and why is adoption so low?

MTA-STS (SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security) is a published policy that tells other mail servers "always deliver to me over TLS, and refuse to fall back to plaintext." It closes a downgrade attack that SPF and DMARC don't touch. It's newer and needs a hosted policy file plus a DNS record, which is more setup than a single TXT line — so even among these top domains only 9.2% publish it. It's the clearest open frontier in email security right now.